刘亦晴, 梁雁茹. 基于演化仿真分析的矿山废弃地治理PPP模式运行机理研究[J]. 中国矿业, 2019, 28(9): 59-66. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2019.09.028
    引用本文: 刘亦晴, 梁雁茹. 基于演化仿真分析的矿山废弃地治理PPP模式运行机理研究[J]. 中国矿业, 2019, 28(9): 59-66. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2019.09.028
    LIU Yiqing, LIANG Yanru. Research on operation mechanism of PPP mode in mine wasteland management based on evolutionary simulation analysis[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2019, 28(9): 59-66. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2019.09.028
    Citation: LIU Yiqing, LIANG Yanru. Research on operation mechanism of PPP mode in mine wasteland management based on evolutionary simulation analysis[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2019, 28(9): 59-66. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2019.09.028

    基于演化仿真分析的矿山废弃地治理PPP模式运行机理研究

    Research on operation mechanism of PPP mode in mine wasteland management based on evolutionary simulation analysis

    • 摘要: 污染防治作为我国三大攻坚战之一,土壤修复领域将引发万亿级投资空间,目前环保PPP模式多集中在有稳定利润回报的领域,探讨PPP模式在低微利项目应用有较好的研究价值。本文以矿山废弃地治理为例,探讨了PPP模式中核心利益者的合作机制,构建了“地方政府-社会资本”演化博弈模型,并用Matlab软件进行数值仿真分析。结果表明:在双方环保意识较强、政府监管成本较低、双方合作能获取收益的情况下,双方主体演化越倾向出现双赢局面。最后提出建立治理长效机制和合理的收益机制、提高违规惩罚力度、吸纳第三方力量降低监管成本提升监管效率三个建议。

       

      Abstract: As one of the three major battles in China, pollution prevention and control will lead to a trillion-dollar investment space.At present, environmental PPP is concentrated in the field of stable profit returns, and the PPP model has a good research value in the application of low-profit projects.Taking the mine abandoned land management as an example, this paper mainly discusses the cooperation mechanism of core stakeholders in the PPP model, constructs the “local government-social capital” evolutionary game model and uses Matlab software for numerical simulation analysis.The results show that under the condition that both parties have strong environmental awareness, low government supervision costs, and cooperation between the two sides to obtain income, the evolution of the two subjects tends to be a win-win situation.Finally, the article proposes three suggestions:establishing a long-term governance mechanism and a reasonable income mechanism, strengthening the punishment for violations, and absorbing third-party forces to reduce supervision costs and improve supervision efficiency.

       

    /

    返回文章
    返回