信息不对称下绿色矿山固体废物综合利用激励契约研究

    Research on incentive contract for comprehensive utilization of solid waste in green mines under asymmetric information

    • 摘要: 现阶段,矿山固体废物产量大、环境危害大、综合利用率低,为设计有效合理的最优激励契约,鼓励引导绿色矿山进行固体废物综合利用,本文综合考虑了政府的激励手段、经济环境总效益、绿色矿山固体废物综合利用努力程度、技术水平以及副产品市场准入标准等多种因素,构建了政府和绿色矿山之间的委托-代理模型,探讨了信息对称和信息不对称下最优激励契约的区别和合理性,激励和引导绿色矿山进行高效的固体废物综合利用。结果表明:政府应该根据绿色矿山努力程度和技术水平等信息掌握的不同程度设计差异化的激励契约模式;政府所设定的固体废物综合利用努力和技术市场准入标准越高,需要给予绿色矿山的固定补贴越多。研究结果为政府设计有效的激励契约提供了一定的理论和实际指导意义。

       

      Abstract: Mine solid waste production is large, environmental hazards are high, and the comprehensive utilization rate is low.In order to design an effective and reasonable optimal incentive contract, green mines are encouraged to guide the comprehensive utilization of solid waste, various factors such as government's incentive means, overall economic and environmental benefits, efforts and technical level of comprehensive utilization of solid waste in green mines and market access standards for by-products are taken into account.The principal-agent model between the government and green mine is constructed.The difference and rationality of incentive contract under information symmetry and information asymmetry are discussed.Green mines are encouraged and guided to carry out efficient comprehensive utilization of solid waste.The results show that:the government should design different incentive contract model according to the information of green mine effort and technology level; the higher the comprehensive utilization of solid waste and the market access standard of technology, the more fixed subsidies the government gives to green mines.The research results provide certain theoretical and practical guiding significance for the government to design an effective incentive contract.

       

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