Abstract: Aiming at promoting the development and construction of smart mines in China and realize the transformation and upgrading of coal production, from the point of view of bounded rationality, an evolutionary game model with local governments and coal enterprises as the main body is constructed, and the evolutionary stability analysis of the unilateral and mixed strategies of the model is carried out.At the same time, the system dynamics model is established based on the current map, the government dynamic punishment and subsidy measures are introduced, and the evolutionary equilibrium point analysis and system simulation are carried out respectively, revealing the interactive mechanism of the strategies of both parties.The results show that there is no evolutionary stabilization strategy for both players under the government's static reward and punishment measures, while dynamic reward and punishment measures can effectively restrain the unstable state of the game between the two parties; local governments can increase disciplinary efforts to effectively increase the rate of smart mining construction in coal companies; the government can promote coal mining companies to develop smart mines through technical support, priority allocation of mineral resources, joint supervision to improve regulatory efficiency, and building smart mining alliances.