基于多层博弈的深海矿产资源开采环境成本内部化研究

    Research on internalization of environmental costs in deep-sea mineral resource exploitation based on multi-layer game theory

    • 摘要: 深海矿产资源开发在缓解关键金属短缺问题的同时,也带来了显著的生态环境挑战,因此,如何有效实现环境成本内部化成为亟需解决的核心问题。本文围绕深海矿产资源开采的不同利益相关者,构建两层博弈分析框架,分析深海矿产资源开采环境成本内部化机理。第一层通过海管局与资源开发企业的Stackelberg博弈模型,揭示了环境税机制通过增加企业环境损害成本,引导企业自主提高环境保护投入、降低资源开采强度,从而实现经济效益与生态效益的协调。第二层博弈模型进一步构建资源开发企业、环境保护组织和海管局的三方博弈模型,分析表明,履约保证金制度和阶梯式污染税的组合政策通过显著增加企业违规行为的潜在成本,有效增强企业合规激励;同时,环境保护组织的监督机制提高违规行为的发现概率,进一步强化了企业选择主动遵守环境标准的倾向。在此基础上,本文提出完善深海资源环境成本内部化的政策建议,包括建立“特许权使用费+环境税”的组合政策体系、完善履约保证金和环境保护基金制度、强化国际监管合作与信息透明机制,以期为国际深海资源开发的可持续治理提供理论参考与政策路径。

       

      Abstract: The development of deep-sea mineral resources has brought significant ecological and environmental challenges while alleviating the shortage of key metals. Therefore, how to effectively internalize environmental costs has become a core issue that urgently needs to be addressed. This paper focuses on the different stakeholders involved in deep-sea mineral resource exploitation, constructing a two-layer game analysis framework to analyze the internalization mechanism of environmental costs in deep-sea mineral resource exploitation. The first layer reveals through the Stackelberg game model between International Seabed Authority (ISA) and resource development enterprises that the environmental tax mechanism increases the cost of environmental damage for enterprises, guides them to independently increase environmental investment, reduce resource exploitation intensity, and achieve the coordination of economic and ecological benefits. The second layer game model further constructs a tripartite game model among resource development enterprises, environmental protection organizations, and ISA. Analysis shows that the combination of performance bond system and progressive pollution tax policy significantly increases the potential cost of corporate violations and effectively enhances corporate compliance incentives. At the same time, the supervision mechanism of environmental organizations increases the probability of discovering violations, further strengthening the tendency of enterprises to actively comply with environmental standards. On this basis, this paper proposes policy recommendations to improve the internalization of environmental costs for deep-sea resources, including establishing a combination policy system of “franchise fees + environmental taxes”, improving the performance bond and environmental protection fund system, strengthening international regulatory cooperation and information transparency mechanisms, in order to provide theoretical references and policy paths for sustainable governance of international deep-sea resource development.

       

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