煤矿经营者安全与生产双重任务的激励研究

    STUDY ON INCENTIVES TO COAL MINE MANAGER TAKING ON TWO-TASK OF SAFETY AND PRODUCTION BASED ON PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL

    • 摘要: 近年来煤矿事故时有发生,一个重要原因是煤矿企业超能力生产,过度追求产量。本文在委托代理框架下,分析国有煤矿企业经营者同时执行安全与生产两项任务的委托代理问题,探讨企业缺乏追求安全积极性的本质原因,得出结论:第一,对产量追求的内在动力超过对安全追求的内在动力;第二,在相同激励条件下,煤矿经营管理者会把较多精力用于生产;第三,对生产的激励应当弱化。最后,对安全激励措施提出了政策建议。

       

      Abstract: Recently accident happened in Chinese coal mine often.One important reason is surfeit production super designed.This article studied the principal-agent problem of manager of state-owed coal mine taking on two-task of safety and production.The metal reason of lacking of safety motivation of coal mine manager was discussed and the incentive principle of government to coal mine manager caring out two-task of safety and production was studied.It is concluded that coal mine manager has more motive seeking production than coal mine safety and they would pay more attention to production under similar incentive ways so that the government should weak incentive to production.And finally policy proposal was put forward to stimulate manager improve coal mine working conditions.

       

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