矿业权拍卖定价模型及最优拍卖机制设计
The auction pricing model of mineral rights and the designing of optimized auction mechanism
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摘要: 我国正在逐步实行矿业权市场化的体制改革,但由于矿业权本身所具有的特性,其价格发现过程非常复杂,往往需要设计特别的交易制度。因此,根据矿业权本身所具有的特殊性,寻求科学合理的定价机制,应是当前矿业权价值研究需着力解决的关键问题。而拍卖作为一种市场化的价格机制,高效地解决了难以估价物品的定价问题。本文在分析矿业权拍卖现状的基础上,从我国矿业权拍卖的实际需要和实际情况出发,以博弈论为主要分析工具,按照规范分析方法,以确定矿业权拍卖过程中的最优保留价为主线,对矿业权拍卖机制进行配置效率分析。并在此基础上,进行最优拍卖机制设计,从而引导矿业权合理流动,优化资源配置,有效防止国有资源的交易性流失。Abstract: China is gradually implementing the reform of mineral rights market, but because of the special nature of mineral rights, the price discovery process is very complicate and often need to design a special trading system. Therefore, it is a significant field in current research on the value of mineral rights to seek scientific and rational pricing mechanism, in accordance with special nature of the mineral rights. While, auction, can effectively solve the pricing problem of difficult valuation, as a market-oriented pricing mechanism. It's analyzed the allocation affectivity and the optimal retaining price in the auction of mineral rights in the article, based on the analysis on the current status of mineral rights, taking game theory and standard analytical methods as the main tool, in the angle of the realistic needs of china's mineral rights market, which can guide the rational flow of mineral rights, optimize the resource allocation, effectively prevent the transactional loss of the state-owned resources, and achieve the national revenue maximization.
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