宁静, 聂方超. 员工脱岗与煤矿企业安全检查的演化博弈研究[J]. 中国矿业, 2019, 28(11): 158-162,167. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2019.11.025
    引用本文: 宁静, 聂方超. 员工脱岗与煤矿企业安全检查的演化博弈研究[J]. 中国矿业, 2019, 28(11): 158-162,167. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2019.11.025
    NING Jing, NIE Fangchao. Evolutionary game research on employee disengagement and coal enterprise security inspection[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2019, 28(11): 158-162,167. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2019.11.025
    Citation: NING Jing, NIE Fangchao. Evolutionary game research on employee disengagement and coal enterprise security inspection[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2019, 28(11): 158-162,167. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2019.11.025

    员工脱岗与煤矿企业安全检查的演化博弈研究

    Evolutionary game research on employee disengagement and coal enterprise security inspection

    • 摘要: 矿工与煤矿企业之间的策略依存性符合博弈论的基本特征。为降低矿工脱岗的极大似然估计值,基于演化博弈理论建立矿工与煤矿企业的博弈模型,分析结果表明:矿工与煤矿企业的策略相互影响且受脱岗外部损失K、脱岗处罚H、检查脱岗成本F等诸多因素影响。结合某集团煤矿脱岗实例验证结论并给出降低矿工脱岗概率的建议。

       

      Abstract: The strategic dependence between miners and coal mining companies is consistent with the basic characteristics of game theory.In order to reduce the maximum likelihood estimation of miners’ disengagement, firstly, based on the evolutionary game theory, the game model of miners and coal enterprises is established.Then the analysis results show that the miners and coal enterprises have mutual influences and are subject to off-site external losses K, dismissal punishments H, inspections.Derailment costs F and many other factors.Finally, combined with the verification results of a group of coal mines, the recommendations for reducing the probability of miners leaving the post are given.

       

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