刘亦晴, 陈宬. 演化博弈视角下矿业生态文明建设利益协调研究[J]. 中国矿业, 2020, 29(11): 61-71. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2020.11.031
    引用本文: 刘亦晴, 陈宬. 演化博弈视角下矿业生态文明建设利益协调研究[J]. 中国矿业, 2020, 29(11): 61-71. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2020.11.031
    LIU Yiqing, CHEN Cheng. Research on the benefit coordination of mining ecological civilizationconstruction from the perspective of evolutionary game[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2020, 29(11): 61-71. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2020.11.031
    Citation: LIU Yiqing, CHEN Cheng. Research on the benefit coordination of mining ecological civilizationconstruction from the perspective of evolutionary game[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2020, 29(11): 61-71. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2020.11.031

    演化博弈视角下矿业生态文明建设利益协调研究

    Research on the benefit coordination of mining ecological civilizationconstruction from the perspective of evolutionary game

    • 摘要: 矿业生态文明作为生态文明建设的重要组成部分,对如何有效推进矿业生态文明建设,相关利益者如何博弈和协调进行研究十分重要。为探索矿业生态文明建设各利益协调机制,本文构建地方政府、矿山企业及矿区公众三方博弈模型,并对三方利益主体行为策略进行了仿真分析。研究表明:中央政府激励、地方政府监管成本、矿山企业绿色开发意愿、破坏开发净收益、矿业开发保证金、矿区公众参与收益、监督成本等显著影响三方主体的博弈演化状态,当地方政府积极推进生态文明建设获得激励收益高于生态文明监管成本、企业绿色开发净收益高于破坏开发净收益、居民参与生态文明收益高于其成本时,三方主体演化趋于理想稳定状态。最后从政府、矿山企业、公众三方利益主体提出矿山生态文明建设补偿机制,合规约束、生态监测,源头治理,绿色矿山建设,矿区利益共享机制,绿色矿业生态区六方面建议和思考。

       

      Abstract: Mining ecological civilization is an important part of the construction of ecological civilization, it is important to study how to effectively promote the construction of mining ecological civilizationand and how do relevant stakeholders play and coordinate.In order to explore the coordination mechanism of various interests in the construction of mining ecological civilization, the article constructs a three-party game model for local governments, mining enterprises and the public in the mining area, and simulates and analyzes the behavioral strategies of the three stakeholders.Research shows that the central government's incentives, local government supervision costs, mining companies' green development willingness, destruction of development net income, mining development deposits, mining area public participation benefits, supervision costs, etc.significantly affect the evolution of the game of the three parties.When the local government actively promotes the construction of ecological civilization to obtain incentive benefits higher than the cost of ecological civilization supervision, the net income of corporate green development is higher than the net income of destructive development, and the income of residents' participation in ecological civilization is higher than its cost, the evolution of the three parties tends to an ideal and stable state.Finally, the authors propose suggestions and considerations in six aspects:the compensation mechanism for ecological civilization construction of mines, compliance constraints, ecological monitoring, source governance, green mine construction, benefit-sharing mechanism of mining areas, and green mining ecological zone from the three stakeholders of the government, mining enterprises and the public.

       

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