赖小君, 胡振琪, 郭家新, 张雪, 王晓彤. 基于演化博弈的煤矿区土地复垦监管策略分析[J]. 中国矿业, 2021, 30(2): 57-66. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2021.02.031
    引用本文: 赖小君, 胡振琪, 郭家新, 张雪, 王晓彤. 基于演化博弈的煤矿区土地复垦监管策略分析[J]. 中国矿业, 2021, 30(2): 57-66. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2021.02.031
    LAI Xiaojun, HU Zhenqi, GUO Jiaxin, ZHANG Xue, WANG Xiaotong. Analysis of supervision strategies for land reclamation in coal mines based on evolutionary game[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2021, 30(2): 57-66. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2021.02.031
    Citation: LAI Xiaojun, HU Zhenqi, GUO Jiaxin, ZHANG Xue, WANG Xiaotong. Analysis of supervision strategies for land reclamation in coal mines based on evolutionary game[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2021, 30(2): 57-66. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2021.02.031

    基于演化博弈的煤矿区土地复垦监管策略分析

    Analysis of supervision strategies for land reclamation in coal mines based on evolutionary game

    • 摘要: 地方政府生态环境监管部门和煤炭企业是矿区生态修复实施的重要责任主体。鉴于我国当前存在的煤矿区土地复垦工作执行力差、部门监管力度不足等问题,从演化博弈的视角构建了以地方政府、煤炭企业以及矿区居民为相关利益主体的煤矿区土地复垦三方博弈模型,通过求解混合策略纳什均衡,采用仿真数值模拟了3个相关利益主体行为演化稳定策略和规律,并选择赵固一矿为研究对象进行了实证研究。研究表明,煤炭企业复垦的概率主要受地方政府监管概率影响,企业初始复垦意愿也影响着政府的监管行为;政府环境绩效与形象损失应纳入评价政府工作中,促使政府监管;政府可适当提高保证金缴纳金额或罚款金额,促使矿山企业复垦意愿提升;同时应开设特殊的监督举报渠道并给予适当的监督补贴,鼓励公众参与监督。

       

      Abstract: Local government ecological environment supervision departments and coal enterprises are the main responsible entities for the implementation of ecological restoration in mining areas.In view of the current problems of poor execution of land reclamation in my country's coal mine areas and insufficient departmental supervision.This paper established a three-party interest body involved in mine land reclamation:a three-party game model of coal enterprises, local governments, and residents of mines.By solving the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, three-party behavior evolution stabilization strategies and laws are simulated numerically, and Zhaogu 1st mine is selected as the research object for empirical research.The researches show that the probability of reclamation of coal enterprises is mainly affected by the probability of local government supervision.The initial willingness of enterprises to reclaim also affects the government's regulatory behavior.The government environmental performance and image loss should be included in the evaluation of government work to promote government supervision.The government can appropriately increase the amount of security deposits or fines to increase the willingness.At the same time, special supervision and reporting channels should be opened and appropriate supervision subsidies should be provided to encourage the public to participate in supervision.

       

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