司训练, 尚慧. 政府补贴、技术创新与煤炭企业产能过剩:过度投资的中介作用[J]. 中国矿业, 2021, 30(4): 29-35,43. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2021.04.023
    引用本文: 司训练, 尚慧. 政府补贴、技术创新与煤炭企业产能过剩:过度投资的中介作用[J]. 中国矿业, 2021, 30(4): 29-35,43. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2021.04.023
    SI Xunlian, SHANG Hui. Government subsidies, technological innovation and overcapacity in coal companies: the mediating effect of overinvestment[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2021, 30(4): 29-35,43. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2021.04.023
    Citation: SI Xunlian, SHANG Hui. Government subsidies, technological innovation and overcapacity in coal companies: the mediating effect of overinvestment[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2021, 30(4): 29-35,43. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2021.04.023

    政府补贴、技术创新与煤炭企业产能过剩:过度投资的中介作用

    Government subsidies, technological innovation and overcapacity in coal companies: the mediating effect of overinvestment

    • 摘要: 在去产能成为供给侧结构性改革首要任务之一的背景下,从政策视角探讨政府补贴对煤炭企业产能过剩的影响及其作用机制。基于2009—2019年沪深A股上市40家煤炭企业的数据,采用柯布-道格拉斯生产函数测算其产能利用率,并运用多元回归分析法探究政府补贴、技术创新与煤炭企业产能过剩三者间的相互关系。研究结果表明:我国煤炭行业产能过剩问题依然严重,政府补贴正向促进煤炭企业产能过剩,技术创新能弱化这一正向影响。进一步地,运用Richardson投资期望模型测度了煤炭企业的过度投资程度,通过建立中介效应模型分析发现:过度投资在政府补贴促进煤炭企业产能过剩的过程中发挥了部分中介作用。据此提出:政府可通过建立以技术创新为目标导向的补贴机制、理清政府和市场的职能边界、构建完善的地方政府绩效考核体系等方式提升煤炭企业产能利用率。研究结论对促进我国煤炭企业早日实现高质量发展具有一定的参考意义。

       

      Abstract: Under the background that reducing overcapacity has become one of the primary tasks of supply-side structural reform, the paper discusses the influence of government subsidies on coal enterprises' overcapacity and its mechanism from the perspective of policy.Based on the data of 40 coal enterprises listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2009 to 2019, the Cobb-Douglas production function is used to calculate their capacity utilization rate, and the multiple regression analysis method is used to explore the relationship between government subsidies, technological innovation and coal enterprises overcapacity.The results show that the problem of overcapacity in China's coal industry is still serious, government subsidies are promoting the overcapacity of coal enterprises, and technological innovation can weaken this positive effect.Furthermore, the Richardson investment expectation model is used to measure the degree of overinvestment of coal enterprises.Through the establishment of an intermediary effect model analysis, it is found that overinvestment has played a part of the intermediary role in the process of government subsidies promoting coal companies' overcapacity.Therefore, it is proposed that the government can improve the capacity utilization rate of coal enterprises by establishing a subsidy mechanism oriented by technological innovation, clarifying the functional boundary between the government and the market, and building a perfect local government performance appraisal system.The conclusion has a certain reference significance for promoting the early realization of high quality development of China's coal enterprises.

       

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