王新平, 雷景婷, 于淮钰. 基于演化博弈的煤炭企业高质量发展动力机制研究[J]. 中国矿业, 2021, 30(5): 27-35. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2021.05.011
    引用本文: 王新平, 雷景婷, 于淮钰. 基于演化博弈的煤炭企业高质量发展动力机制研究[J]. 中国矿业, 2021, 30(5): 27-35. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2021.05.011
    WANG Xinping, LEI Jingting, YU Huaiyu. Research on high quality development dynamic mechanism of coal enterprises based on evolutionary game[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2021, 30(5): 27-35. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2021.05.011
    Citation: WANG Xinping, LEI Jingting, YU Huaiyu. Research on high quality development dynamic mechanism of coal enterprises based on evolutionary game[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2021, 30(5): 27-35. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2021.05.011

    基于演化博弈的煤炭企业高质量发展动力机制研究

    Research on high quality development dynamic mechanism of coal enterprises based on evolutionary game

    • 摘要: 高质量发展是我国煤炭企业的必然选择,分析我国煤炭企业转型升级成效不彰、高质量发展动力不足的原因,对破解煤炭企业高质量发展机制障碍十分重要。为了探索煤炭企业高质量发展的内在动力机制,本文构建了政府-煤炭企业-煤炭能源市场三方非对称动态演化博弈模型,并对三方主体决策演化路径进行了仿真分析。研究表明:在煤炭企业转型升级过程中,政府、煤炭企业、煤炭能源市场的行为决策是相互影响的,当增加对市场和企业高质量发展的补贴及其传统管制效用,降低政策性激励成本时,可以达到政府鼓励扶持,煤炭企业转型升级,煤炭能源市场愿意接受高质量发展的理想目标。最后从政府、煤炭企业、煤炭能源市场三方视角提出煤炭企业高质量发展政策建议,以期形成“企业主体创新、政府指导、市场支持”的体系,从而引领煤炭企业走上高质量、可持续发展之路。

       

      Abstract: High quality development is the inevitable choice of coal enterprises.Analyzing the reasons for the ineffective transformation and lacking of high quality development motivation of coal enterprises, which is important for breaking the obstacles to the high quality development mechanism of coal enterprises.In order to explore the internal dynamic mechanism of high quality development of coal enterprises, this paper constructs a three-party asymmetric dynamic evolution game model for government, coal enterprise, market, and simulates and analyzes the strategies evolutionary path of the three stakeholders.The research results show that in the process of transformation and upgrading of coal enterprises, the different behavioral strategies of the three main bodies of government, coal enterprises and market are mutually influential.By analyzing the rational choices of all parties and their deep-seated reasons, it is concluded that when adopting measures such as increasing subsidies for high quality development of markets and enterprises and their traditional regulatory utility, and reducing government policy incentive costs, etc.The three-party game will evolve to an ideal stable state.Therefore, the ideal operating model can be constructed, that is, the government will encourage high quality development, coal enterprises will embark on a high quality development path, and the coal energy market is willing to accept high quality development.Finally, the paper from the government, enterprises and market three perspectives proposes suggestions, in order to form a system of "enterprise innovation, government guidance, market support", leading coal enterprises to take the road of high quality and sustainable development.

       

    /

    返回文章
    返回