Abstract: Rare earth elements are strategic resources underpinning the energy transition and high-end manufacturing, and control over their supply chains has become a critical arena of great-power competition. As the global rare earth supply chain undergoes profound restructuring, China’s rare earth industry is facing the dual challenges of supply-chain “de-Sinicization” and a trade pattern characterized by “low-price exports and high-price imports”, which has put the strategic leverage of rare earth resources under significant pressure. Against this background, analyzing the evolution of China’s rare earth trade patterns and the price trends of rare earth-related products in China’s imports and exports is essential for assessing China’s changing position and industrial competitiveness in the global rare earth supply chain. To capture the short- and long-term impacts of events such as China’s export controls on medium and heavy rare earths and the restructuring of Western rare earth supply chains, this paper uses monthly China Customs data at the 8-digit HS-code level from 2023 to 2025 to dynamically trace trade-flow changes, characterize spatial pattern evolution, and systematically identify the challenges facing China’s rare earth trade. The results show that: ① China’s advantages in the global rare earth value chain are mainly concentrated in smelting and separation, as well as functional material manufacturing. China imports rare earth ores and semi-processed products, while exporting separated products and rare earth permanent magnets. Affected by events such as the United States’ suspension of rare earth ore exports to China and the closure of some border ports in Myanmar, China’s imports of rare earth raw materials in 2025 declined by 28% compared with 2023 and may decline further in 2026. ② China’s export controls on medium and heavy rare earth-related items have significantly reshaped rare earth trade with Japan and the United States. The United States and Japan are once the largest and second-largest destinations for China’s exports of dysprosium-, terbium-, and yttrium-related products; however, exports of these products to the two countries now account for less than 6% of China’s total exports, while exports of dysprosium- and terbium-related products have almost completely ceased. ③ The increase in China’s rare earth export volume has not translated into higher export value. From 2023 to 2025, China’s rare earth-related products export volume increased by 19%, while total export value decreased by 19%, resulting in a 32% decline in the average export price. Meanwhile, the average price of China’s imported rare earth-related products increased by 22%, substantially compressing the profit margin of China as a global rare earth production base. To address the challenges of declining import stability, shrinking export markets, and narrowing industrial profit margins, China should establish a resource security assessment system by individual rare earth element, conduct import-interruption stress tests, and build a raw-material substitution and allocation mechanism. It should also improve domestic demand absorption, inventory digestion, and compliance support mechanisms following export controls, while promoting the extension of rare earth-related products toward high-value-added functional components and system-level products, thereby strengthening resource security and increasing the unit value captured from rare earth resources.