Abstract: The research purpose is to explore the mechanism of interactions between mining enterprises and mineral supervisors.This paper builds a dynamic evolutionary game model based on the principle of cost minimization.The results show that the strategies of mining enterprises and mineral supervisors depend on four factors：the marginal cost of mining enterprises’ law observance (a)，the punishments of illegal mining (α)，the marginal cost of supervision (b)，and the incentives from supervision (β)，which interact with each other and made a difference.The paper concludes that ① the key factors that impact on mining enterprises and mineral supervisors are α and β，but a and b is the crucial factor for a long-term effective way to raising the probability of mining enterprises’ keeping the law；② the increase of incentives can apparently enhance the supervision of mining，and cause the occurrence of mineral supervisors’ false performance，corruption and ineffective supervision as well；③ mining enterprises are more adept at catching and taking use of the information of mineral supervisors to adjust their strategies.