Evolutionary game analysis of PPP model of abandoned mine management

In order to explore the PPP cooperation mechanism between local government capital and social capital in mining wasteland, this paper constructs a stable equilibrium model of evolutionary game.The results show that when the opportunity cost is less than the opportunistic income, if the local government gains additional income in abandoned mine governance PPP projects, or social capital rewards in reputation, material and other aspects increase, win-win cooperation becomes stable equilibrium strategy; when the government increases the penalties for social capital opportunity behavior and makes the social capital opportunity cost greater than the opportunistic income, the system evolutionary game is dominated by local governments.The government gives external influence in the process of evolution, such as reducing the supervision cost, enhancing the word-of-mouth effect of active cooperation of social capital, reputation gain, and changing the evolutionary result to achieve stable strategic balance.Finally, according to the actual situation of the management of abandoned mines in PPP mode, the article puts forward three measures to reduce the supervision cost of local government, construct the incentive mechanism of social capital and establish the mechanism of reverse restraint and public supervision.