NING Jing, NIE Fangchao. Evolutionary game research on employee disengagement and coal enterprise security inspection[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2019, 28(11): 158-162,167. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2019.11.025
    Citation: NING Jing, NIE Fangchao. Evolutionary game research on employee disengagement and coal enterprise security inspection[J]. CHINA MINING MAGAZINE, 2019, 28(11): 158-162,167. DOI: 10.12075/j.issn.1004-4051.2019.11.025

    Evolutionary game research on employee disengagement and coal enterprise security inspection

    • The strategic dependence between miners and coal mining companies is consistent with the basic characteristics of game theory.In order to reduce the maximum likelihood estimation of miners’ disengagement, firstly, based on the evolutionary game theory, the game model of miners and coal enterprises is established.Then the analysis results show that the miners and coal enterprises have mutual influences and are subject to off-site external losses K, dismissal punishments H, inspections.Derailment costs F and many other factors.Finally, combined with the verification results of a group of coal mines, the recommendations for reducing the probability of miners leaving the post are given.
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