Research on incentive contract for comprehensive utilization of solid waste in green mines under asymmetric information

Mine solid waste production is large, environmental hazards are high, and the comprehensive utilization rate is low.In order to design an effective and reasonable optimal incentive contract, green mines are encouraged to guide the comprehensive utilization of solid waste, various factors such as government's incentive means, overall economic and environmental benefits, efforts and technical level of comprehensive utilization of solid waste in green mines and market access standards for by-products are taken into account.The principal-agent model between the government and green mine is constructed.The difference and rationality of incentive contract under information symmetry and information asymmetry are discussed.Green mines are encouraged and guided to carry out efficient comprehensive utilization of solid waste.The results show that:the government should design different incentive contract model according to the information of green mine effort and technology level; the higher the comprehensive utilization of solid waste and the market access standard of technology, the more fixed subsidies the government gives to green mines.The research results provide certain theoretical and practical guiding significance for the government to design an effective incentive contract.