Evolutionary game of coal enterprises’green mining strategies under government supervision

In order to increase the enthusiasm of coal enterprises to implement green mining technology and encourage coal enterprises to embark on the path of green mining, firstly to establish an evolutionary game model of coal enterprise A, coal enterprise B and the government’s green mining supervision strategy, and to analyze the Jacobian matrix corresponding to each equilibrium point the characteristic value, to discuss the stable strategy of the tripartite after the dynamic game.Then the MATLAB numerical simulation is used to analyze the factors that influence the system to reach the optimal strategy state.The results show that when the initial willingness of the tripartite is neutral, the opportunistic benefits, the cost of implementing green mining technology, the cost of government supervision, and government rewards and punishments will help the system evolve to the optimal strategy state; when the initial willingness of the tripartite is low, the implementation of green mining technology cost, government rewards and punishments help the system evolve to the optimal strategy state; the higher initial willingness of the tripartite will also promote the system to reach the optimal strategic state.Finally, relevant suggestions and countermeasures are put forward for the green mining of coal enterprises.